

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

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UNDERSTANDING AND CONFRONTING ISLAMOFASCISM

by

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Abstract

This paper's thesis is: Understanding that the Global Salafi-Islam Jihad (GSIJ) ideology is not a distortion or perversion of Islam, rather a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation within mainstream Islam, provides the knowledge to effectively proceed in the "War on Terror", or more aptly, the "War on Islamofascism" by using the Information Instrument of Power (IOP)¹ to address terminology, "cultural progression", and support to "moderate" Islam.

The paper used the Problem/Solution methodology. The problem included determining: whether Islamofascism is historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate within Islam; its position within mainstream Islam; and how to apply the Information IOP to combat Islamofascism based on a correct understanding of it. The research revealed Islamofascism is a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation of Islam that garners mainstream Islamic support and overlaps "moderate" Islam on numerous key Islamic concepts.

The solution provided, given the aforementioned understanding, supports US policy to use the Information IOP as the primary way to combat Islamofascism, emphasizing terminology, "cultural progression", and support to "moderate" Islam within the information arena. Terminology includes use of "Islamofascism" rather than current terms in use, "cultural progression" includes accepting the Islamofascist historical accuracy and doctrinal legitimacy to co-opt its foundation, and support to "moderate" Islam considers the challenge of determining "moderate" Islam and subsequently supporting it through various educational programs.

Notes

¹ Information Instrument of Power (IOP): one of four “broad classifications of a wide range of resources, techniques, and capabilities that can and are used by all international actors, both state and nonstate alike” to exert influence. The other three are Diplomacy, Military, and Economic; also known as the “DIME”; see: Edwina Campbell and Lewis Griffith, "An Introduction to the Instruments of Power," *Inter/National Security Studies ACSC AY08 Coursebook* (2004): 166.

Part 1

Introduction

The United States faces a Global Salafi-Islam Jihad (GSIJ) insurgency defined by Al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) in the War on Terror; a challenging threat for a Western culture to grasp. Indeed, Osama bin Laden (OBL) declared in 2001, 'I am a person who love (s) death. And the Americans, they love life. And this is a big difference'.¹ Americans hearing such a declaration would generally assume they are the words of a lunatic. They would not associate the statement with two historical figures revered by one of the world's largest religions, namely Islam. Americans would be arguably wrong on the lunatic assumption and definitively wrong on the non-association with the revered Islamic figures: Khalid ibn al-Walid, one of the greatest soldiers in the Arab world and known as "the Sword of God"² and Islam's first Caliph, Abu Bakr. OBL and AQAM draw their "love of death" mentality from Khalid's actions at the pivotal Battle of Qadisiyya in 637,³ which saw the Arabs defeat the Persians and subsequently conquer Mesopotamia and Persia. Prior to the commencement of the battle, Khalid sent an emissary to the Persians with a message from Caliph Abu Bakr. The message stated: "You [Persians] should convert to Islam, and then you will be safe, for if you don't, you should know that I have come to you with an army of men that love death, as you love life".⁴ The United States National Security Strategy in 2002 captured a similar American misunderstanding of the GSIJ threat with

a vague analysis declaring, “The enemy is terrorism-premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents”.⁵

The United States still does not fully understand the threat it faces in the War on Terror (WOT), as evinced by the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) declaring the WOT threat as a “totalitarian ideology...grounded...in the perversion of a proud religion.”⁶ Likewise, the 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) identified the nature of the enemy as ‘exploiting Islam’.⁷ The GSIJ is neither a perversion nor an exploitation of Islam, rather it draws upon Islam historically and doctrinally to support its objectives of imposing *sharia* law and re-establishing a global Islamic caliphate through the use of violence, to include terrorism. The threat is not a fringe or radical element; rather it overlaps “mainstream” and “moderate” Islam on numerous key concepts. Understanding that the GSIJ ideology is not a distortion or perversion of Islam, rather a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation within mainstream Islam, provides the knowledge to effectively proceed in the “War on Terror”, or more aptly, the “War on Islamofascism” by using the Information Instrument of Power (IOP)⁸ to address terminology, “cultural progression”, and support to “moderate” Islam.⁹

Notes

¹ Hamid Mir, a reporter who interviewed Osama Bin Laden in November 2001, provided the quote during Larry King Live. The actual transcript reads, “You see, he [UBL] told me that, "I am a person who love death." And the Americans, they love life. And is this a big difference”, See: Hamid Mir, "Cnn Larry King Live Transcript," CNN.com, <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/12/lkl.00.html>.; Also see: Evan Thomas, "Gunning for Bin Laden: As U.S. Forces Zero in on Bin Laden, Will the Elusive Terrorist Run or Try to Die Like a Martyr? The Possible Endgame--and the Future of Al Qaeda.," Newsweek, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-27141126_ITM., which has UBL stating, “We love death. The U.S. loves life. That is the big difference between us” as a secondary source of the Hamid Mir and OBL interview.

² Paul Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998), 52.

Notes

³ "Iraq, a Country Study," B&R Samizdat Express, www.samizdat.com/iraq.txt.

⁴ Steven Stalinsky, "Dealing in Death," National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/stalinsky200405240846.asp>.

⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: 2002), 5.

⁶ ———, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: 2006), 1.

⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism " (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), AY 08 ACSC Course Book 499.

⁸ Information Instrument of Power (IOP): one of four "broad classifications of a wide range of resources, techniques, and capabilities that can and are used by all international actors, both state and nonstate alike" to exert influence. The other three are Diplomacy, Military, and Economic; also known as the "DIME"; see: Campbell and Griffith, "An Introduction to the Instruments of Power," 166.

⁹ 37-9064, "Ns Final Exam," (Montgomery, AL: Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), 2007). This research paper is an extrapolation of the author's argument proposed in his five-page ACSC NS final. The NS Final laid the initial proposal for emphasizing terminology and cultural progression. The author's direct quotes, paraphrases, and concepts from NS final are expressed throughout this research paper; as the author is the same for each work, no further citation will be used with respect to the NS Final in this paper.

Part 2

Understanding Islamofascism

Historical Accuracy

The GSIJ maintains historical Islamic accuracy in its use of aggressive, terroristic violence to perpetuate its beliefs by tracing its origins to the very founding of Islam by Mohammed, his doctrines, and his immediate successors. Indisputably, Mohammed's violent personal example and his violent militant expansion of Islam provide fuel and legitimacy for today's GSIJ. A review of Islam's founding clearly demonstrates the violent historical evidence the GSIJ calls forth to justify its modern-day attempt at world domination; a goal nearly accomplished in the early days of Islam.

Mohammed, the final prophet in Islam, founded Islam between 611 and 632. During this time, Muslims believe the angel Gabriel appeared to Mohammed and pronounced him the final Prophet of God (or Allah), and provided him a series of divine revelations. The revelations occurred over two periods, the Meccan and Medina periods. During the Meccan period, Mohammed's nascent following held little sway militarily and bore the fury of a ferocious, murderous, and unrelenting opposition. During this period of fierce opposition and from Mohammed's relative position of weakness, his corresponding revelations from Allah were more pacifistic and tolerant in nature and form the root of the attribution, "Religion of Peace" to Islam.

However, as the situation deteriorated in Mecca for Mohammed and his followers, a pivotal event occurred in 622. Twelve Arab representatives from Medina, impressed with Mohammed's teachings, suggested he travel to Medina and become their leader, as they could not agree among themselves. They promised to follow his teachings and worship only one God. Mohammed accepted their offer and moved to Medina.¹ Once in Medina, Mohammed's following and military strength grew, most probably inspiring several transformations that resonate with the modern GSIJ.

Mohammed's Medinan period witnessed the transformation of his personality, military fervor, and the revelations he distributed. Mohammed's personality transformed from a "simple preacher" to a "vengeful warlord."² In this capacity, Mohammed, with brutal zeal, ordered the beheading of prisoners of war, the assassination of men and women over personal slights, the homicidal robbery of caravans, the raping of captives, and the murder of prominent Jewish merchants. He even praised the cold-blooded killing of a nursing mother.³ The modern GSIJ can see the reflection of Mohammed's personal example in its actions. Concurrent with Mohammed unleashing his personal ferocity, his military fervor exploded in the name of "Jihad".

Mohammed, in like manner as the modern GSIJ, justified his military exploits through the concept of "Jihad", translated literally as "struggle", but more accurately depicted as a "holy war." As commentary within Reliance of the Traveller, a classic manual of Islamic sacred law by the eminent 14th century Islamic scholar Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri's explains, "*Jihad* means to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word *mujahada*, signifying warfare to establish the religion."⁴ Likewise, Mohammed defined jihad through Quran'ic revelation, demanding the militant expansion of Islam and clearly identifying who to fight:

Fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them, in every stratagem of war (sura⁵ 9:5)...Fight those who believe not in Allah, nor the Last Day (sura 9:29).⁶

Mohammed further exhorted his faithful with, “Fighting is prescribed upon you, and you dislike it. But it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you”⁷ and declared those who died in the cause of Islam would receive forgiveness and mercy. Like the modern GSIJ, he extolled martyrdom through jihad with the declaration:

The person who participates in [holy battles] in Allah’s cause and nothing compels him to do so except belief in Allah and His Apostles, will be recompensed by Allah either with a reward, or booty...or will be admitted to Paradise.⁸

Mohammed, providing succor to the modern GSIJ ambitions, synthesized his jihad concept and personal animosities into a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide of Jewish tribes in Arabia.⁹ As the historian Paul Fregosi observed:

Muhammed...was responsible for the deaths of thousands not only in battle but through execution and assassination. Not many are aware of the massive execution by beheading of 600 to 800 men of the Jewish Beni Qoreiga tribe in Medina, who had withheld their support from him after his takeover of the city. He had the executions carried out in the market place, where trenches previously had been dug to receive the corpses. The carnage started in the morning and went on all day and into the night by torchlight. Muhammad left the scene early in the evening to enjoy the charms of Reihana, the young widow of one of the victims, a beautiful Jewish girl who had been set aside for the Prophet’s pleasure.¹⁰

Mohammed’s use of jihad resulted in numerous successful military campaigns which ultimately conquered the Arabian Peninsula during his Medinan period. Indeed, in his ten years in Medina, Mohammed “organized no fewer than 65 military campaigns, personally led 27...Even Napoleon Bonaparte could not better that numerical record.”¹¹

Concurrently, the revelations Mohammed received during the Medina period are correspondingly more militant, violent, and expansionistic in nature, particularly the Quran’s 9th sura.¹² Most scholars, both Western and Islamic, consider the 9th sura as the last or second to last sura revealed to Mohammed.¹³ Mohammed’s personal reign of violence and terror ended with

his death in 632. Paul Fregosi summarized Mohammed's life with, "There was rarely anything gentle about the historic Mohammed."¹⁴ Consequently, the violent nature of the modern GSIJ, rather than standing in stark contrast to a mythologized peaceful Mohammed, emulates his historically violent nature and deeds. Additionally, the subsequent expansion of Islam after Mohammed's death further supports the militant, expansive, aggressive nature of the GSIJ and inspires its goal to re-establish an Islamic Caliphate.

Upon Mohammed's death, Islam continued its violent, jihadic expansion throughout the Arabian Peninsula, into Persia, across North Africa and the Mediterranean, and across Spain. Islam's militant expansion remained unchecked until its defeats at Constantinople in 672 and 717 and at the Battle of Poitiers, France, in 732.¹⁵ In less than 80 years, the Jihad placed under the control of Islam people from Asia to the Atlantic.

The historic fate of the conquered people under the yoke of Islam inspires the modern GSIJ's perception of non-Muslims. For non-Christians and non-Jews, the options under Islam took the form of conversion to Islam or death. However, Christians and Jews had the option of subjugation through acceptance of a Dhimmi status.¹⁶ Dhimmitude consisted of a special tax, second-class citizenship, and a lifetime of humiliations. Paul Fregosi summarizes the historical Dhimmitude conditions:

"Dhimmi"...had to acknowledge the superiority of the Muslims...which was to become one of constant humiliations. They could not carry a weapon or ride a horse, only a donkey. They were not allowed to wear shoes but had to walk barefoot. A Christian who claimed Jesus was divine was automatically executed...Christian religious processions were banned. Non-Muslims had to stand aside if a Muslim passed them in the street...If a Muslim assaulted them, they were not allowed to fight back but were only permitted to ask their aggressor to stop hitting them...The dhimmi were the dregs, the people at the bottom of the pile. If they failed to pay the tribute due their conquerors, they were enslaved or executed.¹⁷

The response to these conditions and the conquest of the Jihad took two forms: the Crusades and La Reconquista.

The modern GSIJ, for self-serving purposes, would concur with the oft-cited, but historically inaccurate concept that European colonialism or imperialism drove the Crusades and La Reconquista.¹⁸ However, reality unveils a different account. Europe launched the historically brief counter-attacks termed the Crusades over 300 years into the Jihadic conquest to counter the onslaught of the Jihad. As acclaimed Middle East historian Bernard Lewis observed, the Crusades were a “long-delayed, very limited, and finally ineffectual response to the jihad”.¹⁹ Conversely, the Spanish liberation from the Jihad-imposed Muslim yoke commenced in 718, taking the form of La Reconquista. It successfully concluded in 1492 or 774 years from its commencement. However, the Islamic Caliphate maintained its hold or expanded its holdings through intermittent Jihad for over 1300 years. The end of the Caliphate built upon Islam’s prophet Mohammed did not occur until the fall of the Ottoman Empire and its successor, Turkey, removing Islam’s official status in 1924.²⁰

The current GSIJ, far from being a new phenomenon, stands on the historical foundation of Mohammed’s violent nature, doctrines, and militant Islamic expansion, which endured for over 1300 years. The modern GSIJ traces its latest evolution across the 20th century, originating near simultaneously with the fall of the last vestiges of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924. It anchors its modern context in the teachings of Mohamed ibn Abd-al Wahhab, an 18th century imam preaching austere Islam based on the 13th century fatwas²¹ of Taq al Din Ammad ibn Taymiyya. Saudi Arabia incorporated Wahhab’s interpretation of Islam into its establishment two centuries later in 1925. The evolution of the GSIJ continued through the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s and the Jamaat-I-Islami in the 1940s. The current GSIJ is firmly rooted in Egyptian origins due to the major ideological contributions of the Egyptians Sayaad Qutb, Mustafa, Faraj, and al-Zawahiri. The thinking of al-Zawahiri built upon OBL’s 1998

fatwa to attack American's across the globe by transforming the modern GSIJ ideology from the local to the global level. Al-Zawahiri emphasized expanding the Jihad beyond the local level to counter what he considered a 'Jewish-Crusader' alliance that would deny GSIJ-styled Muslims the ability to achieve power in Islamic countries.²²

Further demonstrating a longer modern context for the GSIJ, Marc Sageman, author of Understanding Terror Networks, clarifies the GSIJ is not "blowback" from CIA operations in the Afghanistan-Soviet war. Rather the universities and prisons of Egypt in the 1970s cultivated an already existing modern GSIJ.²³ However, key recent milestones in the evolution of the GSIJ include: the end of the Afghan-Soviet war resulting in "homeless" Afghanistan Jihadists joining the GSIJ; the movement of Al Qaeda from Afghanistan to Sudan in 1991, with only committed members making the move; the return of Al Qaeda to Afghanistan in 1996, again distilling the membership to the most committed making the move, and culminating with the 1998 Osama Bin Laden fatwa for global jihad.²⁴ These events across the past century demonstrate the modern GSIJ continues the historical Islamic Jihad march of the preceding 1300 years. Indeed, far from being a historical anomaly, the GSIJ draws upon a historically accurate version of Islam to justify its objectives. But the GSIJ does not rely on the historical deeds of Islam alone to support its objectives; it also espouses Islam doctrinally. The GSIJ does not use a perversion or distortion of Islam for support, but a doctrinally legitimate interpretation.

Doctrinal Legitimacy

The US continues to make a fundamental error in defining the threat by denying the GSIJ holds a doctrinally legitimate interpretation of Islam, which will adversely impact understanding the true Islamic basis of the threat and subsequently inhibit appropriate efforts to counter the threat. The 2006 NSS classification of the threat as a "new totalitarian ideology...grounded...in

the perversion of a proud religion”²⁵ and “defined by religious intolerance”²⁶ ignores the strong legitimate Islamic religious doctrinal foundation of the GSIJ.

Western analysts agonize with the religious connotation of the GSIJ, but the GSIJ movement does not. It understands its ideology as simply Islam. Understandably, Western observers are inclined to dismiss this notion, crying Islam is a religion, not an ideology. However, this position proclaims an inherently Western cultural bias of separation of church and state. Theology is the “study of God and religious truth...opinions concerning God and religious questions” and ideology is a “set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic, or other system.”²⁷ Within Islam, religion and the political and economic systems merge, transforming Islam beyond a Western conceptualized religion and into an ideology.

The historical precedence for the merger of mosque and state originated with Mohammed. During his Medina period, Mohammed turned Medina into “an early exercise in the total blending of religion and self-referential political ideology, of mosque and state.”²⁸ GSIJ leaders grasp this concept, as Jamaat-e-Islami (Muslim Party) founder Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi expressed succinctly: “Islam is not the name of a ‘Religion’...In reality Islam is a revolutionary ideology...which seeks to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets.”²⁹ The leaders of the GSIJ make this crystal clear and argue their position ably within Islamic doctrine. Once the US grasps the concept of an undivided church and state within Islam, it can then properly assess whether the GSIJ ideology has an Islamic basis and merit or is a perversion or distortion of Islam. The GSIJ presents a strong case for its Islamic doctrinal legitimacy.

The GSIJ Islamic ideology expressed to the Muslim world by OBL and Ayman al-Zawahiri portrays a deep seated religious argument. This argument reveals an inner debate within Islam

itself and portrays a GSIJ ideology consistent with Islamic doctrine and far from being a perversion of Islam. OBL frames the debate with the query, “What shared religious goals-which are at the heart of the matter-will allow us to agree with the West?”³⁰ OBL and Zawahiri highlight three critical areas at the center of the GSIJ Islamic interpretation and under debate within the Islamic world: Loyalty and Enmity, Sharia law, and Offensive Jihad. The GSIJ’s doctrinal arguments within these three areas demonstrate a legitimate interpretation of Islam and the threat to the US if it casually dismisses the GSIJ ideology as an unfounded “perversion” of Islam.

The concepts of “Loyalty and Enmity” provide the first argument in the GSIJ’s debate for legitimate doctrinal interpretation of Islam and the subsequent threat to the US if dismissed as a perversion of Islam. The GSIJ comprehension of Loyalty and Enmity will set the Muslim world against the non-Muslim world and will set the foundation for Islamic expansion. Simply put Loyalty is loyalty between Muslims above all others and Enmity is maintaining hatred or at least being clean of anything non-Muslim. Zawahiri does not support this position with political rhetoric; rather he provides the Islamic world Qur’anic verses, demonstrating a legitimate Islamic interpretation for the GSIJ ideology:

Let believers [Muslims] not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] rather than believers: whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah...[Quran 3:28]³¹

Offer glad tidings to the hypocrites, that they have painful torments [in store] – they who take infidels as friends instead of believers...[Quran 4:138-9]³²

O you who have believed! Do not take infidels as allies and friends instead of believers...[Quran 4:144]³³

Aside from the straight-forward reading of these Qur’anic verses, Zawahiri continues his persuasive argument with numerous *hadiths*³⁴ (sayings or acts of Mohammed-second only to Qur’an in providing Islamic understanding for Muslims) to support his position. Understandably

this perspective of Islam will give rise to incredible tensions between the West and Islam, providing the foundation for a Samuel Huntington predicted ‘clash of civilizations’,³⁵ which the GSIJ fully supports. The GSIJ sets Islam against non-Muslims with the Islamic doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity and strengthens the discord with compulsory *sharia* law.

The GSIJ desire and methods to implement *sharia* law provides the next doctrinal argument in the GSIJ’s debate for a legitimate interpretation of Islam. The GSIJ desires the implementation of the *sharia* law as OBL declares, “Muslims...should spread sharia law to the world-that and nothing else....the sharia of Islam is the foundation.”³⁶ However, this is not a radical idea within the Islamic community, based on the overwhelming majorities in several Muslim countries desiring the imposition of *sharia* law.³⁷ World opinion on human rights aside, the imposition of *sharia* law is not particularly the debate the GSIJ has within the Islamic community. Rather the debate centers on the scope and manner of *sharia* application, which the GSIJ upholds historic Islam to legitimize its position, as OBL attests:

They [“moderates”] say that our sharia does not impose our particular beliefs upon others; this is a false assertion. For it is in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon others. Whoever doubts this, let him turn to the deeds of the Companions when they raided the lands of the Christians and Omar imposed upon them the conditions of dhimmi[tude].³⁸

The GSIJ desires to impose *sharia* on Muslims and non-Muslims alike, whereas “moderate” Muslims debate the application of *sharia* to non-Muslims. But more importantly and more consequential to the US, the GSIJ desires to spread *sharia* by force. As OBL espouses:

How can they [“moderates”] claim that we have no right to force a people to change its particular values...Such are lies. In fact, Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the sharia...³⁹

Again, OBL draws upon historically accurate Islamic practice and doctrinal interpretation. This underscores the importance of not dismissing the GSIJ ideology as simply a perversion or

distortion of Islam, as the US will appear to be intentionally distorting true historical facts and consequently undermine its own legitimacy. This GSIJ's avocation of militant expansion of the *sharia* brings into clarity the third and most important point the GSIJ debates for Islamic doctrinal legitimacy within the Islamic community: Offensive Jihad.

The GSIJ's advocating for offensive jihad as a mandate within Islam reveals the final and most dangerous doctrinal argument the GSIJ wages and further demonstrates its Islamic interpretation as neither a perversion nor distortion of Islam. The GSIJ proponents use the Quran as their foundation for offensive jihad, citing sura 9, particularly verse 5: "Slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush."⁴⁰ Opponents of this violent position quote the numerous peaceful verses contained within the Quran; however, they overlook the concept of abrogation or *nasikh wa-l-mansukh*.⁴¹

Abrogation simply states that if there is a conflict between Qur'anic verses, then the chronologically newest verse takes precedence. Most Islamic and Western Quranic scholars agree, Mohammed revealed sura 9, containing the most violent, militant, and expansionistic verses in the Quran, last or second to last; effectively abrogating or cancelling all the previous conflicting peaceful verses.⁴² Not surprising, recalling this aggressive and militant revelation corresponds with the increased military strength and success of Mohammed during his Medinan period. The Quran's 9th sura fuels the GSIJ argument for offensive jihad by outlining three options for non-Muslims: convert, subjugate, or die.⁴³

OBL reinforces the GSIJ's claim to Islamic doctrinal legitimacy for offensive jihad by expounding upon its Qur'anic basis with supportive *hadiths*: "I have been sent in the final hours with the sword, so that none is worshipped but Allah alone, partnerless" and "I have been

commanded to battle mankind until they declare that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”⁴⁴ For the GSIJ, the debate over offensive Jihad is the central doctrinal discussion within Islam. OBL considers it “what the debate [between “moderates” and the GSIJ] truly revolves around”⁴⁵ and defines the central question as: “Does Islam, or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to submit to its authority corporeally if not spiritually?”⁴⁶ The historical answer of Islam is yes.

Impediments to Understanding

Little doubt remains that a doctrinally legitimate interpretation of Islam, although by no means the only interpretation, underpins the GSIJ. Fundamentally, Islam encompasses the GSIJ ideology as highlighted by OBL’s testament, “We aren’t separated from the *umma*⁴⁷. We are the children of an *umma*, and an inseparable part of it.”⁴⁸ However, the US continues to dismiss the GSIJ ideology as a “perversion” and ‘exploitation’ of Islam in part because of the messages the GSIJ presents to the non-Muslim world. The GSIJ presents the non-Muslim world Islamic-based messages that differ in emphasis and substance to the one presented to the Islamic world. These differences aid in keeping the US from understanding a legitimate interpretation of Islam underpins the GSIJ, which subsequently impedes efforts to appropriately and effectively counter the GSIJ ideology along the Information IOP. The specific conflicting GSIJ messages which fuel the US misperceptions include: self-defense, acceptability of killing innocent civilians, and anti-Semitism.

The GSIJ presents an ideology and portrays a message of self-defense to the Western world which obfuscates its true nature to the US and incurs a dismissive acknowledgement of its Islamic legitimacy. OBL began his message of self-defense in his 1996 Declaration of Jihad, emphasizing:

The people of Islam have been afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian alliance and...realized that they were the fundamental target of the hostility of the Judeo-Christian alliance...we work to do away with the injustice that has befallen our umma at the hands of the Judeo-Crusader alliance, especially after its occupation of Jerusalem and its appropriation of Saudi Arabia.⁴⁹

The GSIJ, represented by OBL, continued the message of self-defense to the Western world after the September 11th attacks. In an October 2001 interview with a reporter in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, OBL emphasized, “The mission [of AQ] is to spread the word of God, not to indulge massacring people. We ourselves are the target of killings, destruction and atrocities. We are only defending ourselves. This is defensive Jihad. We want to defend our people and our land.”⁵⁰ The GSIJ’s claim of self-defense incurs a mischaracterization of its Islamic interpretation by the US, as the apparent contradiction between its actions of attack and claims of self-defense undermine the GSIJ legitimacy. However, understanding the GSIJ concept of Enmity, its desire to impose *sharia* law by force, and its belief in offensive jihad reveals the GSIJ deception of its self-defense claim.

The GSIJ interpretation of Islam supports the killing of innocents and is virulently anti-Semitic. These notions conflict with the Western-lens perception of Islam as a religion of peace and result in the US considering an interpretation of Islam that justifies such actions as a perversion or distortion of the religion. However, as Western apologists for Islam in general decry the GSIJ interpretation and fervently declare, “That is not Islam”, the GSIJ supports its belief with Qur’anic interpretation. OBL offered the following in Qur’anic defense of killing innocents:

They say that the killing of innocents is wrong and invalid, and for proof, they say that the Prophet forbade the killing of children and women, and that is true...but this forbidding of killing children and innocents is not set in stone, and there are other writings that uphold it. God’s saying: “And if you punish (your enemy, O you believers in the Oneness of God), then punish them with the like of that with which you were afflicted”⁵¹

Similarly, OBL admitted, “We have incited and urged the killing of Americans and Jews. That is true.”⁵² But, OBL defended GSIJ anti-Semitism and the ultimate goal of world domination with a *hadith* from the al-Bukhari collection (al Bukhari’s *hadiths* doctrinal Islamic legitimacy second only to the Quran in the Islamic world):

“The Hour [Day of Judgment] will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them. When a Jew hides behind a rock or a tree, it will say: ‘O Muslim, O Servant of God! There is a Jew behind me, come and kill him!’ All the trees will do this except the boxthorn, because it is the tree of the Jews.”⁵³

The GSIJ does not haphazardly subscribe to its murderous and genocidal beliefs; rather the most sacred doctrines of Islam can provide sustenance for them. The GSIJ’s condoning the killing of innocents and its global anti-Semitic annihilation objective places the US in denial that the GSIJ provides a doctrinally sound interpretation of Islam. The US must not allow the apparent GSIJ conflicting messages to delude it into dismissing the GSIJ ideology as a legitimate interpretation of Islam. If the US dismisses the GSIJ ideology, it will inappropriately and ineffectively use the Information IOP because it will not properly understand the Islamic GSIJ underpinning.

Distinguishing “Moderate” Islam

Clearly, the GSIJ draws upon a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation of Islam to promote its objectives. Fortunately, the GSIJ does not hold the sole interpretation of Islam. A “moderate” interpretation exists, although GSIJ and “moderate” Islam overlap on numerous key Islamic concepts. Distinguishing GSIJ Islam from “moderate” Islam becomes critical to subsequently provide the ability to appropriately and effectively utilize the Information IOP. Yet, distinguishing GSIJ Islam from “moderate” Islam becomes challenging. As Oliver Roy describes in Globalized Islam, an inherent challenge exists to “isolate and categorise the complex and multilevel practices of more than 1 billion Muslims”.⁵⁴

Distinguishing between GSIJ Islam and “moderate” Islam requires understanding the subtle, yet profound differences on their desires to implement strict Islamic law (*sharia*), re-establishment of the Islamic caliphate as a precursor to eventual world domination, and a staunch advocacy of violence to achieve these ends.⁵⁵ These three points do not separate the GSIJ ideology from “moderate” Islam by their inclusion in GSIJ Islam and their exclusion from “moderate” Islam. Indeed, “moderate” Islam incorporates all three, but it is the scope in which it does that provides the nuanced difference.

Moreover, one must understand “moderate” Islam is not necessarily “mainstream” Islam, nor is the GSIJ necessarily outside “mainstream” Islam. As Bernard Lewis affirms, “Muslim fundamentalists...do not differ from the mainstream on questions of theology and the interpretation of scripture”.⁵⁶ Additionally, one must remove a Western bias of assuming “moderate” Islamic views equates to large majority or plurality views within the Islamic world; a view that contradicts public opinion polls in the Arab world. A 2007 World Opinion Poll on Muslim attitudes in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia demonstrates the GSIJ ideology bears prominence in “mainstream” Islam with, “Many [Muslims] say they share some of al Qaeda’s attitudes toward the US and substantial majorities endorse many of al Qaeda’s goals”.⁵⁷ Similarly, a University of Jordan poll determined 66.8% of Jordanians considered Al Qaeda as a legitimate organization in 2004, although Jordanian AQ support fell dramatically after the November 2005 AQ attack in Amman, Jordan.⁵⁸ As evinced by these polls, GSIJ is “mainstream” Islam on many accounts, specifically with respect to the implementation of *sharia* law and establishment of a caliphate.

The GSIJ and “moderate” Islam share the mainstream desire to establish *sharia* law and a caliphate with the scope of establishment the distinguishing difference between the two.

Consider the 2007 World Opinion Poll determined, “Most respondents express strong support for expanding the role of Islam in their countries—consistent with the goals of al Qaeda... Large majorities in most countries support the goals of requiring a strict application of sharia, keeping out Western values, and even unifying all Islamic countries into a single Islamic state”.⁵⁹ Indeed, fully 71% of the poll’s respondents endorsed implementation of *sharia* law and 65% supported uniting the Islamic countries of the world under a Caliphate. Furthermore, substantially large majorities of Islamic countries surveyed in 2005, with the exception of Jordan, felt Islam played a significant role in their countries; but more importantly, resounding majorities considered it a “good thing”, with the exception of Turkey (50% considered it a “bad thing”).⁶⁰

The subtle difference between GSIJ Islam and moderate Islam in establishing *sharia* law is a “moderate” Muslim would only apply *sharia* law to Muslims, whereas GSIJ Islam would apply *sharia* law to all persons. Similarly, the difference between GSIJ Islam and “moderate” Islam in establishing a caliphate is the breadth of the caliphate. Moderates would include only “historically” Muslim countries, whereas the GSIJ would require the entire world. Just as “mainstream” Islam intermingles with GSIJ Islam on *sharia* and caliphate implementation, so does the characterization of violence to achieve ends.

Both GSIJ and “moderate” Islam support violence in the name of Islam. Unquestionably, both consider violence in defense of Islam legitimate. Defining what is actually defense of Islam further differentiates the “moderate” and GSIJ Muslims as typified in the World Opinion poll finding “support for attacks on US troops in the Muslim world [Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf region][to drive the US from the region] is quite high in Egypt and Morocco. But Pakistanis are divided about such attacks and Indonesians are opposed to them.”⁶¹

The GSIJ's avocation of offensive jihad and the willingness to use terrorism to achieve goals provides the essential differences regarding violence that separates GSIJ Islam from "moderate" Islam. As previously identified, OBL admonishes "Muslims are obligated to raid the lands of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system"⁶² and espouses offensive jihad to ultimately achieve a global caliphate. OBL's own arguments clearly describe those opposed to these concepts as "moderate" Muslims. Additionally, the GSIJ supports the use of terrorism, whereas "moderate" Muslims would renounce the method. In this context, terrorism is measured as attacks against civilians to achieve goals.

The 2007 World Opinion Poll findings support distinguishing the GSIJ from "moderate" Islam based on views of terrorism with, "Large majorities in all countries opposes attacks against civilians for political purposes and see them as contrary to Islam"⁶³ and "majorities or pluralities surveyed opposed al Qaeda's attacks on Americans".⁶⁴ This characterization becomes more complex when attempting to determine the difference between civilians within GSIJ Islam and "moderate" Islam, as Muslims place an ethnic distinction in determining civilians. An example is drawn from Jordan responses to attacks on civilians. In a public opinion poll conducted by the University of Jordan in 2005, fully 92% of respondents rejected the killing of civilians.⁶⁵ Yet the same poll determined only 48.5% considered attacks against Israeli civilians as terrorism⁶⁶, whereas 90.5% classified killing Palestinian civilians as terrorism. Additionally, and in contrast to the 2005 University of Jordan poll, a Pew Poll conducted in the same year determined only 43% of Jordanians rejected violence against civilians.⁶⁷ The subsequent AQ attack in Amman, Jordan, assuredly accounts for the Jordanian reconsideration of what constitutes terrorism between the beginning of 2005 and the end of 2005. Clearly, the critical and most pronounced

distinction between the GSIJ and “moderate” Islam becomes their views on the method and application of violence to support Islam

Notes

¹ Termed *Hegira* or “emigration”. Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 34-39.

² Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet* (Boston, MA: Regina Orthodox Press, Inc, 2002), 37.

³ *Ibid.*, 35-47.

⁴ Umar Barakat’s commentary in ‘Umdat al-Salik’ or “Reliance of the Traveller”, a work of Islamic sacred law that captures the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence. Islam has four Sunni schools of Islamic law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. The four schools are “identical in approximately 75 percent of their legal conclusions”. See: Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller*, ed. Nuh Ha Mim Keller, trans. Nuh Ha Mim Keller (Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publications, 1994), vii, ix, 599.

⁵ Surah: Chapter of the Quran

⁶ Ergun Mehmet Caner, *Unveiling Islam* (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2002), 49.

⁷ Sura 2:216-17, *Ibid.*, 48.

⁸ Hadith 1:35, see: *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹ Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet*, 42.

¹⁰ Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 59.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 61. Note, the quote continues, “...the traditionalist al-Bukhari placed the number at between 15 and 19”.

¹² A “sura” is a chapter in the Quran.

¹³ Faith Freedom International, "The Biggest Lie About Koran Ever Told," www.faithfreedom.org, <http://www.faithfreedom.org/oped/Peaseforeve60415p2.htm>. and Robert Spencer, *Religion of Peace?*, 1 ed. (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc 2007), 78.

¹⁴ Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 38.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 118.

¹⁶ Dhimmi status originated in Quran 9:29, “Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they prohibit what Allah and His Apostle have prohibited, nor follow the religion of truth, out of those who have been given the Book, until they pay the tax in acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection.”, see M.H. Shakir, "The Holy Qur'an," Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc, <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIV0&byte=282392>. and codified in Islamic Law see: al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller*, 602-03.

¹⁷ Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 107.

¹⁸ For an example of a biased rendition against the Crusades and a fleeting mention of the Jihad, downplaying the violence of the Jihad, see: The History Channel, "Inside Islam," (United States: A&E Television Networks, 2002).

Notes

¹⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror / Bernard Lewis*, Modern Library ed. ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 51.

²⁰ Recall on November 14, 1914, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, “in his capacity as caliph, head of the worldwide Muslim community, proclaimed a Jihad against all countries...making war against Turkey-and her Christian allies, Germany and Austria” in WWI; also, “Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk] led Turkey into the modern world when he became president of his country in 1923...He also jettisoned the official status of Islam along the way, and with it disappeared the sultanate and, above all, the caliphate. Since 1924, Islam has survived without a caliph”; quotes from: Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 402-8.

²¹ “Fatwa: A legal opinion or decree issued by a recognized authority and derived from Islam’s roots of jurisprudence (*usul al-fiqh*)” from Raymond Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), xix.

²² Summary of GSIJ origins in the modern context outlined in: Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 1-24.

²³ Ibid. and Brian Johnson, "Book Review of Understanding Terror Networks," (Air Command and Staff College: Sr. Army Advisor Project, 2007).

²⁴ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*. and Johnson, "Book Review of Understanding Terror Networks."

²⁵ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*

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²⁶ Ibid., 7.

²⁷ "The American Heritage College Dictionary," (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company).

²⁸ Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet*, 39.

²⁹ Spencer, *Religion of Peace?* , 42.

³⁰ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 38.

³¹ Ibid., 70.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *Hadiths* or “Traditions” are words or deeds attributed to Mohammed. *Hadiths* provide supplement and context for the Quran. *Hadiths* have been compiled by Islamic scholars in six authoritative collections: al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa’I, and Ibn Maja. The most reputable attributed to al-Bukhari and Muslim. Muslims consider Al-Bukhari’s and Muslim’s compilations of hadiths as second only to the Koran as the source of Muslim doctrine and law. Al-Bukhari accepted only 7,000 of the 600,000 stories he was told about Mohammed. See: Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 46, 48. and Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, xix.

³⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order / Samuel P. Huntington*, 1st trade pbk ed. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).

³⁶ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 33.

³⁷ 71% of respondents supported imposition of sharia law, see: Steven Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," (Washington, D.C.: The Program on International Policy Attitudes: University of Maryland, 2007).

³⁸ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 51.

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³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Shakir, "The Holy Qur'an." Complete verse: "So when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush, then if they repent and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free to them; surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful". The "repent" and "poor-rate" refer to subjugation and paying of a "poll tax" to Islam and receiving the imposition of second class citizenship or dhimmitude; a historically humiliating experience. See previous discussion on Dhimmitude and Robert Spencer, *Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades)* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2005).

⁴¹ Tawfiq Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadi's Mind," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 5 (2007): 19. and Spencer, *Religion of Peace?* , 78.

⁴² Faith Freedom International, "The Biggest Lie About Koran Ever Told."; See also: Spencer, *Religion of Peace?* , 78.; see also: Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadi's Mind."

⁴³ This position principally drawn from the following three Quran'ic passages: Quran 9.5: "So when the sacred months have passed away, then slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush, then if they repent and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free to them; surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful."

Quran 9.29: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they prohibit what Allah and His Apostle have prohibited, nor follow the religion of truth, out of those who have been given the Book, until they pay the tax in acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection." And Quran 9.30: "And the Jews say: Uzair is the son of Allah; and the Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them; how they are turned away!" Shakir, "The Holy Qur'an."

⁴⁴ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 41.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁷ Umma: The international "community" or "nation" of Muslims that transcends ethnic, linguistic, and political definition. See: Ibid., xxii.

⁴⁸ Bruce Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 120.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 25, 27. Quotation over a series of paragraphs in the 1996 Declaration of Jihad, capturing the general tone of the work.

⁵⁰ Hamid Mir, "Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If Us Uses N-Arms It Will Get Same Response," Dawn the internet edition, <http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top1.htm>.

⁵¹ Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, 118.

⁵² Ibid., 108.

⁵³ Ibid., 125. From the hadith collection of al-Bukhari, no. 3,593.

⁵⁴ Oliver Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 6.

⁵⁵ David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism" (2004), 7. and Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas : Jihad against Democracy / Walid Phares*, 1st ed. ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), XVIII.

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⁵⁶ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror* / Bernard Lewis, 24.

⁵⁷ Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," 3. See: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf Background: "WorldPublicOpinion.org conducted an in-depth study of public opinion in Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The research was primarily supported by the START Consortium at the University of Maryland. Other scholars of the START Consortium participated in the development of the questionnaire. Focus groups and surveys were conducted in all four countries. Focus groups were used to identify arguments made spontaneously by people in the region. These arguments were subsequently adapted into survey questions. The surveys were conducted between December 9, 2006, and February 9, 2007, using in-home interviews based upon multi-stage probability samples. In Morocco (1,000 interviews), Indonesia (1,141 interviews), and Pakistan (1,243 interviews) national probability samples were conducted covering both urban and rural areas. However, the Pakistan findings discussed in this report are based only upon urban respondents (611 interviews); rural respondents were unfamiliar with many of the issues in the survey (full data is available in the questionnaire). In Egypt, the sample (1,000 interviews) was an urban sample drawn probabilistically from seven governorates. Sample sizes of 1,000 – 1,141 have confidence intervals of +/- 3 percentage points; a sample size of 611 has a confidence interval of +/-4 percentage points." Ibid, introduction.

⁵⁸ Notably, the survey compared opinions in Jordan after the November 2005 AQI hotel attack in Amman, Jordan. The overall determination of the poll was the attack definitely impacted the perception of Jordanians as compared to a similar survey conducted in 2004. However, although Jordanians perceiving AQ legitimacy fell from 66.8% in 2004 to 20% in Dec 2005, less than half (48.9%) of respondents considered AQ a terrorist organization and 24.3% did not know if AQ was a terrorist organization. Additionally, Jordanian leadership (media, business, political, and academic) saw AQ as a terrorist organization with an overwhelming 73.4%, indicating a disparity between the Jordanian people and their leadership. See: Fares Braizat, "Post Amman Attacks:Jordanian Public Opinion and Terrorism," (Center for Strategic Studies: University of Jordan, 2006).

⁵⁹ Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," 5.

⁶⁰ Pew Global Attitudes Survey, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," (Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005).

⁶¹ Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," 7.

⁶² Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 51.

⁶³ Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ The attitude changed from 76.4% in 2004 rejecting civilian killing to 92.0% in 2005. See previous citation on poll timing background and: Braizat, "Post Amman Attacks:Jordanian Public Opinion and Terrorism."

⁶⁶ Partial discrepancy based on Israel's universal military service incurs Arab consideration that all citizen's of Israel are soldiers.

⁶⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Survey, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics."

Part 3

Confronting Islamofascism

Recognizing the subtle distinction between “moderate” and GSIJ Islam, combined with understanding the GSIJ draws upon a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation of Islam to support its objectives provides the knowledge to effectively employ the Information IOP in the War on Terror. Current US policy, defined by the 2006 National Security Strategy, the 2006 National Military Strategy for the War on Terror, and the National Strategy on Counter Terrorism, correctly identifies the importance of the GSIJ ideology¹ and promotes the Information IOP as the primary way to attack it. To appropriately and effectively combat the GSIJ with the Information IOP, given the aforementioned knowledge, US policy must address three key facets within the information arena: terminology, “Cultural Progression”, and support to “moderate” Islam.

Terminology

The United States must clearly articulate appropriate terminology and its rationale as a crucial step in exerting the Information IOP. Many terms exist for the threat defined by the GSIJ: Islamic “radical”, Islamic “extremist”, Islamists, Jihadists, or using “violent” as a descriptor. However, these terms portray an inaccurate or confusing threat image. Instead, in a bold, logical move within the use of the Information IOP, the US should use the term

“Islamofascism” to clearly define the threat. Before identifying the validity and necessity of using Islamofascism, one must understand the shortfalls of the common terms in use.

The use of the Islamic “radical” or Islamic “extremist” portrays an image that the GSIJ ideology is far from historical and doctrinal Islam and a minority outside “mainstream” Islam. As history, doctrinal debate, and all three previously cited opinion polls clearly indicate, this is far from reality; particularly on defining elements of *sharia* and caliphate establishment and the use of force. An Arab colleague expressed a revealing summary of Islamic thought when confronted with the assertion AQAM’s view of Islam and “mainstream” Muslim’s views coincided. Initially, he took umbrage at the assertion, but after qualifying it by removing the use of violence to achieve ends, he readily concurred, “Oh, if you remove violent means, then we are really not far apart at all.”² It may not be a comforting notion, but the United States must accept the Islamic concepts espoused by the GSIJ are not necessarily radical or extreme in the Muslim world. Rather their views are mainstream and do not deserve to be dismissed with Chamberlain-like ignorance. Indeed, one cannot dismiss the historical parallel that the German Nazi party came to power with little more than 30% of the vote in the 1930s.³ Realizing “radical” or “extremist” mischaracterizes the threat, one must examine the term “Islamist” as an option.

“Islamist”, the self-proclaimed term of the GSIJ insurgents paints the exact opposite picture desired for the very reasons the threat uses it. “Islamist” effectively indicates, “One who practices Islam.” In the American mind, when one states “Islamist”, the intuitive understanding is too infer “one who practices Islam” or simply to understand it to mean any Muslim. This association pairs the GSIJ ideology directly with Islam and will lead readers to believe any articles discussing the GSIJ with the term “Islamist” means all of Islam. This runs counter to the goal of separating the identifiable threat, whether a majority or a minority view, from an

interpretation of Islam compatible with the West. Likewise, “Jihadist” and “violent” as descriptors paint a similarly inappropriate picture.

The term “Jihadist” is an inappropriate term to use for several reasons. First, it may lend legitimacy to the GSIJ, as the history of violent, militant, Islamic expansion of early Islam is considered a Jihad in the Muslim world and upheld with admiration. Second, using the term “jihadist” to define the threat undermines efforts to promote a “personal struggle” or greater jihad concept within Islam. A *hadith* of questionable origin claims Mohammed described militant jihad as a lesser jihad and the greater jihad as a personal struggle against one’s sinful inner-self.⁴ Granted, conceiving jihad as primarily a “personal struggle” recently “hijacked” by the GSIJ is a historically bankrupt concept as evinced by 1300 years of history. Indeed, “the overwhelming majority of early authorities, citing the relevant passages in the Qur’an, the commentaries and the traditions of the Prophet, discuss jihad in military terms.”⁵ However, the US can still support attempts to transform the understanding more along spiritual lines.

Likewise, the use of “violent” does not transition well into the Islamic world. The Muslim world accepts the use of violence to defend Islam, particularly if the target is considered legitimate. As the 2007 World Opinion poll demonstrates, “respondents express significant...approval of attacks on US troops in Islamic countries”⁶ and the 2005 Pew Poll reflects a range of support for violence against civilians in defense of Islam including a 57% approval in Jordan.⁷ Similarly, the history of Islam is rife with religiously sanctioned violence. The critical distinction in modern times is to accurately categorize the violence. The term “Islamofascism” does just that.

The 2006 NSS, NSCT, and NMSP-WOT, recognize the war as a battle of ideas against a totalitarian ideology grounded in a perversion of Islam. Although mistakenly considering the

ideology as a perversion of Islam, their description offers a logical extension to describe the threat with a term articulated by President George W. Bush: Islamofascism.⁸ Islamofascism is semantically and academically accurate and invokes the proper negative image of the GSIJ.

Islamofascism is semantically and academically accurate. Reviewing the dictionary yields a definition of: “a system of government marked by a totalitarian dictator, socioeconomic controls, suppression of the opposition, and usually a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism.”⁹ This accurately depicts the GSIJ’s ideological aspirations: a caliph will fill the role as a totalitarian dictator; sharia law will provide socioeconomic controls; the GSIJ’s concept of Enmity prescribes racist-like relations with non-Muslims; and jihad ably depicts a belligerent nature. The potential technical shortfall with the fascism label is the thought it generally aligns with nationalism, but the GSIJ does advocate nationalism, simply nationalism for the “Muslim nation” on a global scale. Perusing the academic debate on what constitutes fascism uncovers a spectrum of beliefs, but theorists argue at “their deepest levels all forms of fascism contained a ‘mythic core’, which comprised a belief in the necessity of destroying existing political forms and the establishment of a ‘new order’.”¹⁰ The GSIJ aligns nicely with this concept, offering the “golden age” of Mohammed as the mythic core and the re-establishment of the caliphate as the ‘new order’. The use of “Islamofascism” simply defines the nature, source, and type of the fascism. As the GSIJ’s doctrinal arguments attest, the debate for GSIJ ideology is deeply rooted in Islam and to deny this point blindly ignores history and legitimate inter-Islamic debate. But more important than the semantic and academic correctness of the term is the powerful imagery the term invokes.

The use of “Islamofascism” places the proper imagery in the American, European, and Muslim mind; an image of religious totalitarianism and intolerance on par with the evil design

and repression of Nazism. Equally as important, the terminology and imagery provides the individual Muslim with a clear choice, either he is an “Islamofascist” or a “Progressive or Enlightened Muslim” that is anti-Islamofascist. The image spurred by Islamofascism strips away the generic veneer of “terrorism” and places it in the context of the ultimate design of the GSIJ: the establishment of global or regional Islamic domination and imposition of Islamic law with no separation of church, or more aptly, mosque and state.

By extension of using Islamofascism to define the threat, the US should term the current war as the “War on Islamofascism”. As LTC Kilcullen outlines in Countering Global Insurgency, the “War on Terror” is a misnomer as it is akin to stating a “War on Ambushes” or a “War on Grenades”, as they are merely means to an end.¹¹ Defining the “War on Terrorism” as a “War on Islamofascism” brings the ultimate endstate of the GSIJ into sharp focus. As seen in the teachings of the GSIJ,¹² the ultimate desire is restoration of an Islamic caliphate and a globe completely dominated by Islam and Islamic law. As an Islamofascist emphasized, “Islam requires the earth-not just a portion, but the whole planet.”¹³ Likewise, another confirmed the goal to “transform the West into Dar Al-Islam” either by the sword or “ideological invasion.”¹⁴

The challenge using the term Islamofascism within the Muslim world includes linguistic education and sensitivity to the historical Islamic/Nazi connections. The education of the Muslim world on its linguistic meaning is paramount. Anecdotal evidence yields Muslims tend to think Islamofascism translates as “Islam is fascism”, rather than the term defining a specific portion within Islam that maintains Islamofascist beliefs. To counter this perception, one must use the terms “progressive”, “enlightened”, or “anti-Islamofascist” opposite the term Islamofascist within discussions to demonstrate a differentiation among Muslims. The second challenge is accepting the historical Islamic/Nazi connection and emphasizing the use of the term

is not meant as a reminder of the Middle East and Balkan Muslim support to Hitler. Upon establishing Islamofascism as the proper term to label the GSIJ threat, the US must address the next area within the information arena: “cultural progression”.

“Cultural Progression”

The US must implement the concept of “cultural progression” in the use of the Information IOP to effectively combat Islamofascism. Cultural progression is the concept cultures can move beyond antiquated notions that run counter to modern lawful international relations and human rights. To advance cultural progression with the Information IOP, the US must accept Islamofascism’s historical accuracy, abandon religious relativism apologetics, and disavow false revisionist history. Subsequently, the US can actively promote education and globalization to advance cultural progression. Before the US can properly focus education activities, it must accept the historical accuracy of the Islamofascism.

US policy must acknowledge the Islamofascism’s “subjugate, convert, or die” Islam as a historically accurate depiction and a doctrinally legitimate interpretation.¹⁵ Acknowledging the Islamofascist position undermines the “ideological underpinnings of violent Islamic Extremism”¹⁶ because it co-opts its foundation. Perpetuating the fraudulent position that the Islamofascism “hijacked” Islam countermands 1300 years of history. More abhorrently, it provides legitimacy to Islamofascism because of the appearance of a Western attempt to “cover-up” historical truth. The Muslim writer Irshad Manji underscores the misuse of the “hijacked” concept:

I couldn’t stand this metaphor [Islam had been “hijacked”]. It implied that Islam itself was a plane cruising toward some haven of human rights, and that, had September 11 not happened, the passengers of Air Koranistan would have reached their wondrous address with nary a bump...Hijacked. As if our religion were an innocent bystander in the violence perpetrated by Muslims. Hijacked. An emotionally charged word that acquits mainstream Muslims of the

responsibility to be self-critical...being self-critical means coming clean about the nasty side of the Koran, and how it informs terrorism.¹⁷

Additionally, acknowledging the historical roots of Islamofascism within Islam allows the West to draw a parallel to the American, European, and African toleration of slavery prior to the mid-19th century; a position advocates supported scripturally in the Old and New Testaments. As history has shown, the US, Europe, and Africa culturally progressed and no longer consider slavery acceptable and view the subject through different scriptural prisms.

Similar to the acceptance of Islamofascism's historical accuracy, the US must no longer fall prey to the apologetic dialogue that equates Islamic jihad with Christian militant activities. As the Islamic apostate Abdul Saleeb attests to the nature of atrocities committed in the name of Christianity in The Dark Side of Islam:

When Christians have engaged in such violence, they have betrayed the teachings of Jesus Christ and have turned their back on the examples that Christ set for us in the New Testament. But when Muslims engage in violence, murder, and other acts of terrorism, they can legitimately claim that they are following the commands of God as found in the Qur'an and in the examples of Muhammad and his teachings.¹⁸

Discontinuing the Islamic/Christian relativism, beyond its historical and doctrinal fallacy, denies an air of acceptability to modern Islamofascist atrocities.

Ending historically and doctrinally inaccurate discussions extends into disallowing revisionist historians to continue to omit the fact that Europe launched the Crusades principally as a counter-attack to the Islamic Jihad as previously demonstrated. Promoting the historical reality of the Jihad and the Crusades delegitimizes Islamofascist attempts to frame their global insurgency as a historically ongoing defensive measure against the West. Instead, it places the Islamofascist insurgency as a historically ongoing offensive-oriented, militant attempt to expand Islam by jihad. Additionally, emphasizing the Crusades' historical reality will undermine

Islamofascist attempts to portray US operations as a Crusade¹⁹ because the associated historical image would depict a legitimate counter-strike to Islamic aggression.

The History Channel's Inside Islam film exemplifies revisionist, apologetic history. The program described the initial 300 years of aggressive, militant Islamic Jihad as simply "rapid expansion", casually noting it occasionally occurred "by the sword", yet described the Crusades as an "invasion" and "European colonialism". Additionally, the film dwelled on the barbaric sacking of Jerusalem by the Crusaders, yet failed to discuss genocidal acts committed by the Muslims.²⁰ Such revisionist depictions legitimize Islamofascist's claims of ongoing historical self-defense and inhibit understanding Islamofascism as a historical, reoccurring threat. Implementing educational programs will assist countering this failed educational legacy.

Instituting educational programs in the US and the Muslim world will critically assist the implementation of cultural progression. Within the US, the government can advocate the transmission of historically accurate segments on PBS and NPR. As of 2007, PBS failed to fully support historically accurate segments pertaining to Islamofascism as evinced by its reprehensible suppression of the documentary, "Islam vs. Islamists". PBS partially suppressed the \$675,000 tax-payer funded documentary because of the film's anti-Islamofascist advocacy.²¹

Likewise, the US can support academic research within the Islamic world. Tawfiq Hamid, a former Islamofascist, demonstrates the necessity to reach Muslim students with appropriate education, as his Egyptian state-sponsored education guided him to Islamofascism and eventually joining Jamaah Islamiyah.²² Hamid identified standard curriculum in many Middle Eastern educational systems supports Islamofascist ideology through endorsing the enslavement and rape of female war prisoners, the beating of women, polygamy, pedophilia, and execution of

apostates and homosexuals. More distressingly, he exposes, “there is no single approved Islamic textbook that contradicts or provides an alternative to the passages” supporting these positions.²³

In combination with educational systems, US policy can use globalization to promote “Cultural Progression” within the Islamic community. Granted, globalization and the inexorable march of “Cultural Progression” will bring its share of cultural backlash; indeed, partial credit to the reemergence of Islamofascism goes to the countering of globalization.²⁴ However, use of cultural “soft power”, as defined by Joseph Nye in The Paradox of American Power,²⁵ within cultures prone to Islamofascism, will lead them to a better life and dissuade them from Islamofascism. Indeed, the use of Western technology and living, while maintaining various aspects of their own cultural identity, fulfills a desire for better living rudimentary to human beings and will allow US efforts in combating Islamofascism to ultimately prevail. Upon implementing the concept of cultural progression in the Information IOP, the US must address the most critical area within the information arena: support to “moderate” Islam.

Promoting “Moderate” Islam

The long-term success in the War on Islamofascism will result from the US promoting the “moderate” Muslim voice. ‘Aye, there’s the rub’,²⁶ finding the elusive “moderate” Muslim and more importantly, grasping what “moderate” Islam means. As previously demonstrated, a subtle difference exists between Islamofascism and “moderate” Islam. Even in the Islamic world, debate rages on defining “Islamic extremism,” with Muslims torn between the imposition of strict sharia law or the violent removal of non-Muslim influences as a definition.²⁷ This highlights the need to define “moderate” Islam before searching for “moderate” Islam proponents.

As a proposed base-line definition, “moderate” Islam does not advocate terrorism, defined as the killing of non-combatants, nor the use of violence to expand Islam.²⁸ Although not precluding a version of Islam that advocates self-defense against an internationally recognized invasion, it rules out violently expansive Islam. Moreover, in defining “moderate” Islam, the US must not delude itself into believing “moderate” Islam aligns with generally accepted American values, nor assuming “moderates” are the ‘silent majority’, as previously cited polls dispel these notions. A “moderate” Islam advocating American values, particularly with regards to human rights, probably extends the definition of “moderate” Islam beyond an achievable doctrinal Islamic consensus. Classic challenges include: women’s rights, death for apostasy, Enmity against non-Muslims, pedophilia²⁹, and anti-Semitism. Locating a “moderate” Muslim holding American views on these issues, doctrinally substantiated within Islam, may prove fruitless. As a “moderate” Arab colleague attested, he had to accept *sharia* law, not in part but in whole, to include death to apostates by stoning, otherwise he would place his entire faith in question and risk falling outside Islam. However, he does not condone violent expansion of Islam and believes he can maintain friendship with non-Muslims as long as they are not at war with Islam.³⁰ From this understanding, defining “moderate” Islam as a version against terrorism and violent expansion allows the search for “moderate” Islam to begin.

The obvious and only legitimate source for a call to “moderate” Islam must come from within the ranks of Islam. However, these voices must have solid doctrinal grounding in the Qur’an as illuminated by OBL. OBL displayed disregard and contempt for Saudi intellectuals’ attempts to espouse “moderate” Islam. His disdain emphasized they had not “clarified to the West how the Muslim is to coexist with the infidel, based on [Qur’anic] verses and hadiths,” and

offered had they done so, “it would have been a blessed enterprise.”³¹ But the Saudi intellectuals’ Qur’anic dearth stripped the legitimacy of their argument.

Conversely, Wazhma Frogh, a women’s rights advocate, demonstrated the power of Qur’anic-based arguments against Islamofascism by using them to save her life and establish an Afghani women’s literacy program. Initially, a local Afghani mullah directed her death because she advocated for a women’s literacy program. Frogh countered his death sentence with a Qur’anic-based argument, which moved the mullah to give his blessing for the project. As Frogh keenly noted, “In a country where religion is so important...arguments based on principles of universal human rights or on what international conventions say don’t persuade many Afghans.”³² From this perspective, it becomes evident the challenge of finding legitimate “moderate” Islamic voices as epitomized by The Trouble with Islam and Taking Back Islam.

The The Trouble with Islam is written by Irshad Manji, a lesbian, Canadian Muslim. The belief Islam should reform to modern practices and thoughts without regard for doctrinal Quranic grounding underlies her argument for “moderate” Islam. Manji overlooks abrogation and stakes her claim to non-doctrinal reform with, “the Koran is a bundle of contradictions” with “blatant inconsistencies” and advocates to “openly question the perfection of the Koran.”³³ She considers the Islamic duty to imitate the Qur’an a “big lie...a big, beard-faced lie.”³⁴ While her perspective may resonate with atheists or agnostics, it holds no legitimacy within the Afghan mountains or the Arabian sands. An Arab colleague emphasized, ‘If I want advice on relations with women, I would consult her as an expert. However, she holds no credibility on Islam.’³⁵

Similarly, the work Taking Back Islam, a collection of essays from primarily American Muslims, holds little sway in the larger Islamic world. The essays present sound, well-structured arguments for non-Muslim, Western, secular humanists, but lack Qur’anic credibility for an

Islamic audience. Indeed, it takes 28 pages and 7 essays to present the first Qur'anic verse and another 2 essays to use Qur'anic substantive debate for "moderate" Islam. In contrast, GSIJ literature is rife with Qur'anic-based justification. Given the challenge of determining legitimate "moderate" Islamic voices, the question arises, who then should the US support through the Information IOP?

The US must provide Information IOP support to "moderate" Islamic voices that renounce terrorism and the use of violence to expand Islam and base their beliefs in Qur'anic interpretation. One possibility is Ali Gomaa, the Egyptian grand mufti.³⁶ However, Gomaa exemplifies the challenge of identifying a credible moderate Muslim. He is against female genital mutilation and against apostasy death sentences, but condones beating of women and endorses Hezbollah.³⁷ Another possibility is promoting Sufi Islam, which Tawfiq Hamid describes as allowing a non-violent interpretation of Qur'anic passages.³⁸ Inevitably, it is challenging to determine who represents "moderate" Islam. America must also wrestle with the concept that beyond the base-line definition of an Islam that renounces terrorism and violent expansion, the remaining Islamic beliefs will often clash with American values.

However, once the US determines the proper "moderate" Muslim voices to uphold, it can support them through various ways within the Information IOP. One way includes the education of military and government officials on historically accurate Islam and providing them with a counter-message from Islamic sources grounded in Islamic doctrine. Granted, this provides a moderate Muslim message through a non-Muslim source, but the message would originate from an Islamic scholarly source. Additionally, the US can host websites, whether overtly or covertly, providing the "moderate" Islamic voice to the world. The US can provide funding, whether

overtly or covertly, to efforts promoting “moderate” Islam; however, the liability of revealing covert funding to such a program must be considered heavily.

Opponents will exist to decry the promotion of a religious-based ideology by the US government. Unquestionably, government funding of Christian missionaries would raise calls of a new “crusade” within both the West and Islam. Hypocritically, the same opponents would consider promotion of the “moderate” Islamic voice as cultural sensitivity. Yet, as politics makes strange bedfellows, the US must embrace supporting “moderate” Islam within the Islamic world and view the support as promoting an ideology rather than a religion. Although the two are dynamically opposed on several fronts, support to “moderate” Islam is similar to supporting democracy, as both will confront Islamofascism.

Notes

¹ See Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism". Kilcullen's argues the GSIJ as a global insurgency, which emphasizes the importance of an ideology because it is an insurgency; Galula underscores the importance of an ideology to an insurgency in: David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).; See also argument defining the ideology as the Center of Gravity in an insurgency in: Mark P Krieger, "We the People Are Not the Center of Gravity in an Insurgency," *Military Review* (2007).

² From personal conversation of author, March 2008.

³ “The Nazi Party’s electoral breakthrough came in 1930, when its vote rose to 5 million and it won 107 seats in the Reichstag (the German parliament), a leap from 2.6 per cent to 18.3 per cent of the vote. This figure rose to 37.3 per cent in the July 1932 election, although it slipped slightly to 33.1 per cent in November 1932.” Richard Thurlow, *Fascism*, ed. Richard Brown and David Smith, Cambridge Perspectives in History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42.

⁴ The hadith in question states Mohammed said, “We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad” and Mohammed explains the greater jihad is spiritual warfare against the lower self (nafs) [internal moral challenges], whereas the lesser jihad is warfare to establish religion see: al-Misri, *Reliance of the Traveller*, 599. The origin of this hadith is questioned within the Islamic community. The Islamic argument against this hadith includes: “Within the Sanad [lineage of transmission] of this Hadith a narrator by the name of Yahya bin Al Ula Al Bajili who according to Imam Ahmad is a known Kadhdhaab -liar-, and forger of Hadith. Also, Amru bin Ali, An Nasai and Daruqutni state: "His Hadith are renounced." Ibnu Adi states: "His Hadith are false." [Refer: Tahdhibut Tahdhib 11/261-262]”; Also: “Ibnu Taimiyyah states: "There is a Hadith related by a group of people which states that the Prophet (s.a.w) said after the battle of

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Tabuk: 'We have returned from Jihad Asghar [lesser] to Jihad Akbar' [greater]. This hadith has no source, nobody whomsoever in the field of Islamic Knowledge has narrated it. Jihad against the disbelievers is the most noble of actions, and moreover it is the most important action for the sake of mankind." [Refer: Al Furqan baina Auliyair Rahman wa Auliyaisy Shaitaan, matter 44-45],” see: Robert Spencer, "Is The "Greater Jihad" Really Spiritual Struggle?," Jihad Watch, www.jihadwatch.org/archives/005014.php. See also: Team BBC, "The Internal Jihad," BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/jihad_2.shtml.

⁵ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam : Holy War and Unholy Terror / Bernard Lewis*, 31.

⁶ Kull, "Muslim Public Opinion on Us Policy, Attacks on Civilians and Al Qaeda," 7.

⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Survey, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," 27.

⁸ President used this term in several speeches. One example of a August 7, 2006, speech given in Crawford, TX, located in White House press release: George Bush, "President Bush and Secretary of State Rice Discuss the Middle East Crisis " The White House, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060807.html>.

⁹ "The American Heritage College Dictionary."

¹⁰ Thurlow, *Fascism*, 5.

¹¹ Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism", 1.

¹² Spencer, *Religion of Peace?* , 39-45.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵ Per previous historical and ideological discussion. Also see: Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries.*; Qur'an, sura 9, to include verse of the sword.

¹⁶ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: 2006), 11.

¹⁷ Irshad Manji, *The Trouble with Islam* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003), 42.

¹⁸ Abdul Saleeb and R.C. Sproul, *The Dark Side of Islam* (Wheaton, Illinois: Good News Publishers: Crossway Books, 2003), 84.

¹⁹ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 272-73.

²⁰ See: The History Channel, "Inside Islam."

²¹ See: Kevin Mooney, "Pbs 'Sympathetic' to Radical Islamists, Filmmakers Say " CNSNews.com

<http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=/Culture/archive/200708/CUL20070830b.html> .; see Kevin Mooney, "Nation of Islam Allowed to Review Pbs Documentary on Moderate Muslims," CNSNews.com

<http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=/Culture/archive/200708/CUL20070830a.html> .; and see: Roger L. Simon, "Film Review: "Islam Vs. Islamists" " PJM Hollywood, http://www.pajamasmedia.com/2007/05/film_review_islam_vs_islamism.php.

²² Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadi's Mind."

²³ *Ibid.*: 21.

²⁴ Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, 6.

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Notes

²⁶ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*.

²⁷ Pew Global Attitudes Survey, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," 24.

²⁸ This definition partially aligns with the NMSP-WOT definition except the NMSP-WOT omits the violent expansion of Islam and confuses "moderates" with "mainstream". The 2006 NMSP-WOT definition: "'Extremists' are those who (1) oppose – in principle and practice – the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies and (2) support the murder of ordinary people to advance extremist ideological purposes. 'Moderates' or 'mainstream,' refer to those individuals who do not support the extremists. The term 'moderate' does not necessarily mean unobservant, secular or Westernizing. It applies to people who may differ from each other and from the average American in any number of ways except that they oppose the killing of ordinary people." See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism ", 3.

²⁹ The pedophilia propensity within Islam originates from the Islamic Prophet Mohammed taking a six-year old child bride and consummating the relationship when she was nine, as recorded in al-Bukhari hadith. See also: Phares, *The War of Ideas : Jihad against Democracy / Walid Phares*. And Spencer, *Religion of Peace?*

³⁰ Personal conversation of author, March 2008.

³¹ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 23.

³² Jill Carroll, "Inside Islam, a Woman's Roar," Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0305/p13s03-lign.html>.

³³ Manji, *The Trouble with Islam*, 36.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Personal conversation of author, March 2008.

³⁶ "Mufti: An Islamic scholar from the class of *ulema* specialized in *sharia* law and capable of issuing legal opinions (fatwas)" and "Ulema:...all past and present scholars who have made it their business to know and study every aspect of Islam" See Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, xx, xxii.

³⁷ "U.S. News: Wife-Beatin', Statue-Hatin' Mufti Ali Gomaa "Counters the Tide of Islamic Extremism", " Jihadwatch.com, <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/020211.php>. and Jay Tolson, "A Voice of Moderation: Egypt's Grand Mufti Counters the Tide of Islamic Extremism," *US News & World Report* 144, no. 8 (March 17, 2008).

³⁸ Hamid, "The Development of a Jihadi's Mind," 20.

Part 4

Conclusion

Use of the Information IOP to address terminology, “cultural progression”, and support to “moderate” Islam based on understanding Islamofascist Islam as a historically accurate and doctrinally legitimate interpretation within mainstream Islam will guide the “War on Islamofascism”, albeit over a long-term, generational timeline, to a successful conclusion. However, reaching a “successful conclusion” is predicated on defining success as the marginalization and ensuing impotence of an Islamic interpretation that accepts terrorism and demands the violent expansion of Islam. This definition and ensuing endstate effectively results in a “cold war” paradigm between the US and large elements of Islamic society. The subsequent battle over what constitutes a proper ideology, whether American perceptions of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness or Islamic notions of the human condition under *sharia* law can then occur on the battlefield of ideas, without military confrontation.

Hence, understanding the historical and doctrinal Islamic legitimacy of Islamofascism and its close association with mainstream and “moderate” Islam allows the US to make an informed decision on how to define success and the consequences of decisions of how to proceed in the War on Islamofascism. Should the US proceed forward and fulfill its global manifest destiny to support an American version of “freedom, justice, and human dignity”,¹ it will face an adversary in Islam. As previously identified, the Islamofascist, “moderate”, and “mainstream” Islam agree

in opinion and Islamic doctrine on numerous concepts that would repudiate an American concept of freedom, justice, and human dignity. Further, the historical record of Islam over 1300 years and the example set by its founder, Mohammed, support Islamic values in stark contrast with American values. As previously noted, OBL recognizes, “the conflict with the Crusading Americans is over values of justice-both in theory and practice; likewise with freedoms.”² Perhaps the United States should not beat its swords into plowshares just yet.³

Notes

¹ President George W. Bush declared “freedom, justice, and human dignity” as a pillar of the US national security strategy, see: Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*

ii.

² Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, 50.

³ Isaiah 2: 4; God, *The Student Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992).

Glossary

Fatwa: “A legal opinion or decree issued by a recognized authority and derived from Islam’s roots of jurisprudence (*usul al-fiqh*).”¹

Hadith (“Traditions”): words or deeds attributed to Mohammed. *Hadiths* provide supplement and context for the Quran. *Hadiths* are an important source for determining the *sunna* and by extension the *sharia*. *Hadiths* have been compiled by Islamic scholars in six authoritative collections: al-Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa’I, and Ibn Maja. The most reputable attributed to al-Bukhari and Muslim. Muslims consider Al-Bukhari’s and Muslim’s compilations of hadiths as second only to the Koran as the source of Muslim doctrine and law. Al-Bukhari accepted only 7,000 of the 600,000 stories he was told about Mohammed.²

Mufti: “An Islamic scholar from the class of *ulema* specialized in *sharia* law and capable of issuing legal opinions (fatwas).”³

Sharia: “The “way”. Drawn mostly from commandments, prohibitions, and precedents found in the Koran and sunna, the sharia is a comprehensive body of laws governing Islamic society. Understood to be Allah’s Law, and often translated as “Divine Law,” the sharia covers everyday issues such as politics, economics, finances, business and contractual laws, dress codes, dietary laws, familial obligations, and sexual ethics.”⁴

Sunna: “The words, habits, and practices of Muhammad, as transmitted by reliable witnesses and recorded in the *hadith*.”⁵

Sura: chapter in the Quran.

Ulema: “All past and present scholars who have made it their business to know and study every aspect of Islam.”⁶

Umma: The international “community” or “nation” of Muslims that transcends ethnic, linguistic, and political definition.⁷

Notes

¹ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, xix.

² See: Fregosi, *Jihad in the West: Muslim Conquests from the 7th to the 21st Centuries*, 46, 48. and Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, xix.

³ Ibrahim, ed., *The Al Qaeda Reader*, xx.

⁴ Ibid., xxi.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., xxii.

⁷ Ibid.

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